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Philip Noel-Baker, the League of Nations and the Abyssinian Crisis, 1935-1936. 
 
Gaynor Johnson. 
 
When examining the existing literature on the League of Nations’ approach to the 
Abyssinian crisis, it is impossible to escape negativity.  The League’s actions were 
too little too late and displayed an extraordinary lack of insight in to the motives 
behind Mussolini’s foreign policy, especially in north Africa.  The crisis represented 
the last straw, the final demonstration of how poorly equipped the League was to 
respond to any serious challenge to its authority.   Consequently, after the ‘resolution’ 
of the crisis in 1936, the League was viewed by all but a few as defunct as Europe 
drifted closer to the outbreak of world war in 1939.  And so it goes on.  As a result, it 
would be a difficult task indeed, in the weight of the available evidence, to try to 
argue to the contrary, and it is not the purpose of this chapter to embark on such a 
task.  Instead, this chapter aims to provide a reminder that those who had championed 
the League since its creation were well aware of its shortcomings and certainly did not 
view it with rose tinted glasses.  This point is at best acknowledged but glossed over 
by some of the existing scholarship on the Abyssinia, and is overlooked completely 
by the majority.  In this context, most references are to Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, 
whose promotion of the Peace Ballot in the summer of 1935 and his use of the League 
of Nations Union to resurrect public consciousness about the work of the League in 
Britain at least.1     
However, an alternative but revealing commentary on the crisis is provided by 
one of the other celebrated architects of the League, Philip Noel-Baker.2  Like many 
liberal internationalists of his generation, Noel-Baker believed that it was Labour 
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party foreign policy objectives that were most in keeping with his sympathies, 
especially their emphasis on disarmament and collective security.  For him, the 
foreign policy of the Conservative governments that dominated so much of the 
interwar period was too rooted in the reinforcement of potentially dangerous alliances 
that could result in Britain being dragged in to war.  Noel-Baker’s hatred of war had 
been forged by his experience of the diplomatic climate in Paris during the peace 
conferences of 1919 and by his subsequent role as a member of the League of 
Nations’ Secretariat and Secretary to the British delegation to the League in the mid 
1920s.  His first direct association with Labour foreign policy came in 1924, when he 
became private secretary to Charles Cripps, Minister for League of Nations Affairs in 
the first Ramsay MacDonald administration.  An unsuccessful attempt at election as a 
Labour MP in the General Election in the winter of 1924 led Noel-Baker to pursue an 
academic career for five years, during which he became a recognised authority on the 
history and theory of disarmament practises, publishing a book on the subject in 1926.  
Returned to the House of Commons as MP for Coventry in May 1929, he was 
appointed parliamentary private secretary to the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson.  
At the time of the outbreak of the Abyssinian crisis, Noel-Baker remained convinced 
that the League would still be able to galvanise international support for an effective 
programme of disarmament and for a policy of collective security.  The events of 
1935-6 also coincided with a brief hiatus in Noel-Baker’s political career.  Having lost 
his seat in the 1935 General Election, he remained outside parliament until he 
successfully fought a by-election in Derby in July 1936, just weeks before the war in 
Abyssinia came to an end.  During this time, he channelled his energies into 
canvassing Labour party support for a more proactive League involvement in 
resolving the crisis and in to writing, publishing The Private Manufacture of 
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Armaments in 1936.3  Unlike Cecil, whose defence of the principles of international 
law on which the League was founded was always that of a seasoned politician and 
diplomat, and unlike the much more profoundly intellectual Gilbert Murray, Noel-
Baker’s sought to give credibility to the League through a mixture of practical 
political advice and a variety of academic writing that drew much from his own 
experiences of international affairs.4  From this, it would be an exaggeration to claim 
that Noel-Baker’s opinions made an enormous impact.  They were directed at 
supporters of a party that formed only a minority part of the National Government 
throughout the Abyssinian crisis and were offered when he himself was out of office.  
But despite this, Noel-Baker’s opinions should not be dismissed.  In 1935, he was 
better connected to men with actual political power in Britain and in Europe than 
either Cecil or Murray who, being a generation older, were now relatively on the 
political margins, despite their involvement in the Peace Ballot of that year.  He was 
also one of the few to propose alternative strategies for the League to adopt rather 
than restricting himself to lamenting the limitations of British and French 
commitment to its work.  None of his ideas became policy, but they do provide an 
important reminder that not all of the League’s supporters believed in 1935-6 that the 
only way in which that organisation could survive was through a metamorphosis into 
a body with military might at its disposal.5  It is tempting to see Noel-Baker as being 
naïve in that respect, not simply because the League’s successor, the United Nation, 
later had an army at its disposal or because the elder statesmen of the British pro-
League lobby were also in favour of such a change by this time.  But that would be 
unjust.  While offering dire warnings of the consequences of a weak League response 
to the Abyssinian crisis, Noel-Baker firmly believed that no matter how tense 
international relations became, no country would be foolish enough to trigger a 
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second world war.  He was wrong of course, but he was not alone in believing this to 
be the case.  And indeed many of those who believed that war would be averted 
because it was too awful to contemplate were also convinced that an important way of 
ensuring that did not come about was through the special diplomatic commitment of 
Britain and France to each other and to the cause of peace.  On this point, Noel-Baker 
was less convinced than many of the strength of the Entente Cordiale, and its ability 
to weather the diplomatic crises prompted by Europe’s fascist dictators.  Hence a 
second theme explored in this chapter is the importance of the Anglo-French 
relationship to understanding the Abyssinian crisis.  And in contrast to Noel-Baker’s 
biographer, David Whittaker, this analysis of the internationalist’s attitude towards the 
events of in Abyssinia suggests that he was not an idealist but that he tried to take a 
pragmatic approach to the crisis.6 
 The diplomatic origins and course of the Abyssinian crisis are discussed 
elsewhere in this book and so do not bear significant repetition here.  However, there 
exist comparatively few accounts of the League’s constitutional and diplomatic 
responses to that event.  There are two of importance: the first by F.P. Walters, 
himself a League activist, is a two-part history that appeared in the 1960s.7  The 
second is F.S. Northedge’s history of the League published in the 1980s.8  Walters’ 
point is simple: the League had done its best with limited resources against a series of 
challenges posed to its authority made by increasingly bellicose dictators.  The 
Abyssinian crisis was typical of this.  Northedge set the League response within a 
broader diplomatic framework – that the League had been created by men incapable 
of recognising that the conduct of diplomacy in the decades after the Great War 
required a more robust approach than a reliance on the goodwill of nations to maintain 
collective security and the use of economic sanctions.   
 5 
Northedge also compares the origins of the Sino-Japanese Manchurian crisis of 
1931-32 with the Abyssinian crisis.  The two events, he argues were quite different.  
The Japanese invasion did not constitute an act of aggression because of Japan’s 
existing commercial links in Manchuria, but the same could not be said about the 
Italians in Abyssinia.9  This is debateable.  The Italians had been endeavouring to 
broker deals with the Abyssinians since the end of the nineteenth century, most of 
which were based on trade and rights of access to the sea.  What was different 
between the two crises was that during the second, the League made no attempt to set 
up an international commission to resolve the situation as it had done over Manchuria.  
Instead, it endeavoured to handle the discussions through the use of special 
commissions of the League Council.  The League had been involved in attempts to 
resolve the dispute before the actually outbreak of hostilities.  Between the Wal-Wal 
incident on 5 December 1934, and the skirmish at Wardair and Gerlogubi in January 
and February 1935, the League Council encouraged the Abyssinians and the Italians 
to settle their differences.10  The hoped for means of arbitration was not, however, 
provided by the League itself, but under Article 5 of the treaty concluded on 2 August 
1928 that stated that if a diplomatic dispute between the two countries arose that could 
not be resolved, under no circumstances would either part resort to force, but would 
submit the matter to arbitration.  But such means proved to be useless in settling the 
Wal-Wal dispute, causing anxiety in the Council to grow that should war break out, 
Britain and France would be drawn into the conflict.  The Italians, however, were 
anxious that only the Wal-Wal question was subject to arbitration while the 
Abyssinians wanted the entire issue of Italian efforts to redefine the borders in all 
surrounding territory to be subject to the investigation.  The Italian view prevailed 
although debates continued about suitable nationalities for the arbiters.  On 3 
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September 1935, a team of two Italians, a French man, an American and the Greek 
Minister in Paris, Politis, agreed that the Wal-Wal incident was a minor infraction and 
not worthy of further investigation.   
Studies of the Abyssinian crisis are right to emphasise the centrality of the 
volatile Anglo-French relationship in explaining why no diplomatic solution that 
favoured the Abyssinians was found to the crisis.  This was not only true in the wider 
arena of British and French foreign policy, but also, and especially within the context 
of the League.  In July 1935, an extraordinary session of the League Council met and 
was optimistic that the British and French would be able to broker a deal with the 
Italians to prevent war.11  The negotiations took the form of a summit in Paris 
between the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval, the British Minister for League of 
Nations Affairs, Antony Eden and Baron Aloisi, the Italian representative in Geneva, 
from 16-19 August.12  But not for the last time, the British and French governments 
found themselves on opposing sides, with Eden siding with the Abyssinians.  Laval 
was more inclined to accept the argument made by the Italians for an occupation on 
the grounds that Abyssinia was in need of social and economic reform in order to 
keep the its population in check and to stop them posing a threat to general Italian 
trading activities in that part of north Africa. 
Consequently, when the Council met a fortnight later, little progress had been 
made on an Anglo-French solution to the crisis.13  However, an important 
development was the joint British and French suggestion that the Italians should be 
allowed to garrison troops in Abyssinia.  Noel-Baker argued that this provided a good 
example of one of the problems with the way in which the League conducted its 
affairs.  In an undated note entitled ‘Rearmament and the Collective System’, he 
argued that ‘the wrong policy is the policy of international anarchy and power 
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politics’.  To him, the discussions of the summer of 1935 suggested that the British 
and French viewed the crisis in dangerous nineteenth century terms of imperial 
conquest – the type of national rivalry that many had regarded as such an important 
cause of the First World War - rather than in the more open diplomatic terms that the 
League had been set up to promote.  Abyssinia was a pawn in the activities of the 
Great Powers, with Italian requirements accommodated in some form despite the 
Italians being the aggressors.14  In a later note from the same period, his criticism was 
more scathing: 
If the League is destroyed, we revert to international anarchy and 
the balance of power.  Then all wars become wars of national 
policy, for in every war what both sides mean by self-defence is 
the defence of their own view of their rights and interests - 
generally over some such matter as colonies, or concessions, or 
maintaining the balance of power, or national prestige.15 
In the eyes of old-school diplomats, the decision not to consult the Abyssinians was 
justified because Britain, France and Italy had signed an agreement in 1906 promising 
co-operation between them to maintaining the territorial sovereignty of Abyssinia.  
The Abyssinians had not been consulted then so there was little reason for consulting 
them thirty years later. 
 Yet, despite the willingness of the British, French and Italians to play Great 
Power politics, the Abyssinians were more willing than they to use the Covenant of 
the League as the principal weapon in their defence.  While it could be argued that in 
the face of such overwhelming circumstances they had few other options, their 
approach was nevertheless measured, intelligent and showed no sign of desperation.  
The head of the Abyssinian delegation in Geneva, Jeze, requested that the Council to 
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take immediately action, even before the outbreak of hostilities.  His suggestion was 
that under Article 15 of the Covenant, a committee should be set up to examine all 
areas of the Italo-Abyssinian relationship, that Britain and France should be members 
of this committee.  Despite Italian objections, the Council of Five, as it became 
known, consisted of representatives from Britain, France, Poland, Turkey and was 
chaired by the Spanish diplomat, Salvador de Madariaga.  The Council was to draw 
up a scheme of international economic and financial aid for Abyssinia, examine ways 
in which British and French imperial interests in north Africa could be protected in 
the event of a territorial adjustment of Abyssinia to accommodate Italian needs.  This 
included giving Abyssinia access to the sea on condition that measures were taken to 
meet Italian grievances about the insecurity of its borders with Abyssinia and the lack 
of connection, except by sea, between Eritrea and Somaliland.  The plans were 
rejected as inadequate by Mussolini in September 1935, while Jeze continued to 
promote the ideas as a basis for further negotiation.16 
However, the plans came up against further problems when Anglo-French 
differences about how to resolve the crisis became more public.  Sir Samuel Hoare, 
the British Foreign Secretary, was much more concerned with resolving the situation 
as soon as possible with a limited focus on the long-term consequences of the crisis.  
A speech made to the League Assembly on 11 September 1935 made it clear that the 
British response to the crisis over Abyssinia would be limited to responsibilities under 
the Covenant and nothing more.17  ‘One thing is certain.  If the burden is to be borne, 
it must be borne collectively.  If risks for peace are to be run, they must be run by all.  
The security of the many cannot be ensured solely by the efforts of the few, however, 
powerful they may be’.18  In contrast, Laval had his eyes fixed on the way in which 
the Anglo-French response to the crisis could create a precedent for the way in which 
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the League dealt with the territorial ambitions of Europe’s other enfant terrible, 
Hitler.  Thus, for different reasons, Hoare and Laval concluded that there was little to 
be gained by provoking Mussolini through the threat or use of sanctions or actual 
military confrontation.  As Laval told Hoare, ‘There ought to be no provocative talk 
of sanctions and no wounding of Italian feelings’.   
Despite this, when Mussolini’s forces finally crossed the Abyssinian frontier in 
October 1935, the most powerful members of the League had already concluded that 
their response to the crisis would, in effect, decide its final fate as a credible 
international organ of peace.  On 7 October 1935, all members of the League Council 
except Italy decided to adopt the report of a committee appointed two days earlier to 
examine the responsibilities of the League now that the act of aggression had formally 
taken place.19  Italy was to be condemned under Article 12 of the Covenant which 
provided for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.  As a result, all 
members of the League were required to impose sanctions on Italy as defined under 
the terms of Article 16 – the only time that this article was ever invoked in the history 
of the League.  The Italian case for launching the invasion was made by Aloisi at the 
meeting of the Assembly on 10 October 1935, in which he argued that Abyssinia was 
a ‘country which has no government capable of exercising its authority throughout its 
territory, whose frontiers are not delimited, which not merely fails to mete out 
equitable treatment to conquered peoples, but exploits them, subjects them to slavery 
and destroys them’ was entitled to the benefits of the sanctions clauses of the 
Covenant.20 
While Noel-Baker agreed with the decision to apply sanctions against Italy ‘in 
view of the flagrant and wholly unjustifiable aggression…which constitutes without 
doubt a much plainer and more reprehensible international crime than that of the 
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Kaiser in 1914’, other more sweeping measures were also justified.21  The League 
Council should swell its ranks to include the United States, Germany and Japan.22  All 
three countries, of course, were currently not members of the League and, for 
different reasons, unlikely to (re)join.  This suggestion therefore would have proposed 
huge diplomatic problems most of which would have been insurmountable.  But even 
if these three powers had agreed to this request, there was not provision within the 
Covenant for extraordinary members of the Council to be appointed.  The history of 
the Geneva Protocol a decade earlier had demonstrated how difficult it was to 
persuade the League to reform itself in response to outside pressure.23  Furthermore, if 
the Covenant could be modified to accommodate these countries, it could muddy the 
waters when it came to the application of its other conditions, especially as a number 
of the articles, including Article 16, were couched in apparently ambiguous language.  
There was also the issue of the time that all of these negotiations would take given 
that the League was faced with a clear and present danger to its authority. 
Noel-Baker did not favour British and French military intervention in Abyssinia, 
but recommended that the Suez Canal should be closed to Italian forces and that an 
Anglo-French air presence be sent to the region to police that.24  Additionally, he 
believed that if Mussolini was in breach of the League Covenant, he was also in 
contravention of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that had outlawed recourse to war 
to resolve diplomatic disputes.  As a result, every country should immediately recall 
their ambassadors from Rome.  Thus for Noel-Baker, the League was only capable of 
providing part of the required response to the crisis - the use of economic sanctions.  
It was beyond the remit of that organisation to limit Mussolini’s ability to provide 
logistical support for his invading forces or to provide the censure of a complete 
shunning of Italy by the international diplomatic community.25  Nor did he anticipate 
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that the League, with or without external support, was capable of resolving the crisis 
quickly.  As he told Henry Cummings, ‘this business is going to drag on in a 
thoroughly messy, ineffective and confused manner, probably with tempers rising on 
both sides, incidents multiplying as the Italians start stopping munitions going to 
Abyssinia, etc. and I still think it will end in war’.26  He also believed that the British 
government would be powerless to stop this happening because of the strength of 
public opinion.  Only months earlier, the British government had received an 
overwhelming endorsement of the work of the League through the Peace Ballot.  
Consequently, it would be electoral suicide to scale down a British commitment to the 
League at this time.27  Noel-Baker was even more scathing and pessimistic about the 
situations to the French politicians with who he corresponded.  In October 1935, he 
told the future French premier, Leon Blum: ‘The thing is fast becoming a real disaster.  
If in the present circumstances the League cannot even restrain a war like this, when 
every card is in its hands, what hope can we have of ever making it an instrument to 
check Hitler and keep peace in Europe?’28 
There was not unanimous support for the imposition of sanctions within the 
League.  The Austrian delegation had little desire to inflame relations with the Italians 
further by being party to them.  Similar concerns were expressed by a number of other 
countries that shared a frontier with Italy, especially the Albanians and the Swiss, 
again indicating that Mussolini’s campaign in Abyssinia was viewed at the time as 
potentially the start of a wider process of territorial aggrandisement and not sui 
generis.  Nevertheless, in October 1935, at a special session of the Assembly, fifty-
four League members voted that Italy was in breach of the Covenant under Article 
12.29  The task of overseeing the implementation of sanctions was charged to a co-
ordination committee, which began work on 11 October – known as the Committee of 
 12 
Eighteen, chaired by the Portuguese diplomat, Vasconcellos.30  Its work was divided 
into five sections: placing an embargo on exporting arms to Italy, withholding loans 
and credits, prohibiting the import of Italian goods, a ban on the export of parts for 
industrial plants, and to minimise the economic effects on the sanctionist states of the 
imposition of these sanctions.  By 31 October 1935, fifty governments indicated their 
support for the first of these proposals, forty-nine to apply for the second, forty-eight 
the third and fourth, and thirty-eight the fifth, with the beginning of the 
implementation of sanctions scheduled for 18 November.31 
The scrupulously democratic way in which League decisions were arrived at 
struck a profound chord with Noel-Baker.  For him the League was a socialist entity 
and that only the Labour Party properly understood this.32  Only the international 
Labour movement was completely committed to the principles of collective security 
and mutual assistance.  Noel-Baker’s correspondence with the French socialist, Leon 
Blum, during the Abyssinian crisis reveals that he believed in the creation of a joint 
Anglo-French socialist League policy.  A formal agreement that would give concrete 
shape to the hitherto nebulous idea of the Entente Cordiale would be concluded.  This 
would operate parallel to the Franco-Soviet pact to ensure that the damaging politics 
of self-interest that had been allowed to permeate the work of the League through the 
activities of the Conservative-dominated National Government in Britain, for 
example, would not have the chance to do so again.  Such a strategy would – and this 
point particularly appealed to Blum – give France a central role in the creation and 
implementation of the new League policy.33  However, the reason why Noel-Baker 
wished to give the French such a role was not out of respect for their contribution to 
League efforts to find a solution to the Abyssinian crisis.  It was, in fact, just the 
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opposite.  In a letter to The Times two months before the Abyssinians capitulated, he 
had written that:  
 the half-hearted action of France about the Italian-Abyssinian war 
has gravely chilled our friendship.  We do not like the way the 
French treat the League as a sort of particular umbrella, valuable for 
keeping France out of the wet, but when not so needed to be rolled 
up and used only for gesticulation.  Had she thrown her whole heart 
into maintaining that authority of the League against Italy, the 
League would have succeeded…But France has been half-hearted, 
lukewarm, laggard, dilatory [and] ineffective in her support of the 
League against Italy.34 
If that situation were allowed to continue, the results for Britain and for European 
diplomacy were likely to be catastrophic.  By ensuring that the countries with which 
France had the closest alliances had robust and proactive League policies, that would 
give the French little choice but to have the same.  As Noel-Baker told Blum: ‘The 
fundamental foundation upon which alone any League of Nations can be made to 
work is…the cooperation of the democracies of France and Great Britain.’35 
 Another feature of the League’s response to the Abyssinian crisis was that it 
revealed its processes were too slow to respond to the pace of events.  The ability of 
the League to undermine its own effectiveness through excessively ponderous 
deliberations was not lost on journalists of the time.  As the pro-fascist, anti-League 
Saturday Review noted in June 1935, whatever ‘the rights and wrongs of the Italian-
Abyssinian quarrel, we ought to give thanks to Signor Mussolini for showing 
everybody the unreality of the Geneva Institution and what a myth this collective 
security inherently is’.36  The speed at which the League worked was not just 
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problematic because of the delay of decisions that resulted with all of the implications 
that had for the conduct of international diplomacy.  It exposed a fundamental flaw in 
the way in which the League had been established to conduct its business.  Open and 
free debates in the Assembly with committees pouring over the finer practical and 
ethical details were all very well in theory.  But they took no account of the 
momentum of international crises and of the fact that non-League members had little 
reason to respect the time it took for the League’s grinding bureaucracy to come in to 
operation and for it to act upon its findings.  An example of this is the debate about 
the imposition of oil sanctions against Italy, first proposed by the Canadian delegation 
to the Committee of Eighteen in November 1935.37  The French and British 
governments were sceptical about taking such a step, fearing that that combined with 
a growing British naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean might be construed by 
Mussolini as an act of war.  Hoare’s focus thus shifted away from the League to 
securing a promise of French support in the event of an Italians attack on the British 
fleet.  On 18 December 1935, the Committee of Eighteen took upon the question, 
intending to reach a definite decision about oil in the light of an experts report on how 
the existing sanctions without reaching any conclusion about oil, proposing instead 
the creation of a second committee to examine that question.38  However, this 
subcommittee, charged with examining the extent to which an embargo on oil might 
affect Italy’s ability to cover its oil requirements, did not present its final report until 
12 February 1936. 
The public watchword of the British, French and Soviet members of the League 
during the early months of the crisis was the importance of maintaining the principle 
of collective security that formed the bedrock of the Covenant.  To maintain the 
League as it had been envisaged by its creators implied a willingness to act selflessly 
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if necessary and to come to the aid of a fellow member in their hour of need.  Noel-
Baker was not convinced that such altruism existed, especially among the British and 
French delegations, nor was he convinced that the entire foundation of the attitude of 
those countries towards Italy was morally just.  When reports began to circulate about 
Hoare’s negotiations with Laval about a compromise deal between the Italians and the 
Abyssinians, Noel-Baker told Kingsley Martin of the New Statesman,  
There should be a strong protest at the procedure of the two 
great Powers bargaining with the aggressor as to how much of 
the territory of the victim of aggression they think he ought to 
have as the price of peace…[Italy and Abyssinia] are not just 
Parties to a dispute in which we are mediating; one is a victim 
of aggression we are sworn to protect and the other is the 
aggressor whom we are pledged to stop.39 
Indeed the discussions in Paris of a peace plan in December 1935 were to provide the 
context to a lengthy statement by Noel-Baker about the legality and morality of the 
Abyssinian crisis.  What is clear from his analysis is that the Committee of Eighteen 
did not have a clear mandate for its work and that much of its deliberations were taken 
up with discussions about priority and procedure rather than with the substance of the 
crisis.40  He was anxious to point out that the negotiations between Hoare and Laval to 
conclude a deal with Mussolini over the partition of Abyssinia were taking place 
without the approval of the League, despite British and French attempts to argue to 
the contrary.  ‘The Anglo-French manoeuvre at the Coordination Committee was a 
most discreditable piece of sharp practice, intended to deceive public opinion into 
believing that the League had somehow approved of the Anglo-French haggling with 
the aggressor which was always as wrong in principle as it has proved disastrous in 
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practice.’41   The British and French were engaged in ‘an Imperialist, annexationist 
peace’ that was ‘a flagrant violation of Article 10 of the Covenant and which would 
establish the principle that treaties may be broken and war may be used as an 
instrument of national policy within the framework of the Covenant’.42  The situation 
was made worse because of assurances from Hoare that the British government was 
committed to resolving the crisis through the offices of the League. Noel-Baker’s 
statements on these issues, especially the idea that the war in Abyssinia was ‘Musso’s 
imperialist escapade’ was also partly prompted by the publication in November 1935 
of Inquest on Peace by ‘Viglilantes’, the nom de plume of the League official, Konni 
Zilliacus.43  The proposal contained in this book for a ‘discreet Anglo-French-Italian 
deal behind the scenes which would then be put over on the Abyssinians and 
subsequently presented at Geneva as a triumph for peace and conciliation’ was 
regarded by Noel-Baker as concrete evidence that the League needed to take stock of 
the principles on which it had be founded.44 
 That his part in the Hoare-Laval pact effectively ruined the British Foreign 
Secretary’s career has been widely documented.45  However, sight is often lost of the 
fact that his position was not without support, especially within the League.  Paul van 
Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister, had told the Co-ordination Committee on 18 
November that the efforts made by Hoare and by Laval to reach a diplomatic 
settlement should be given full time to take shape and that other measures that could 
have a negative effect on League relations with Mussolini should be shelved, at least 
on a semi-permanent basis.  Van Zeeland was also a pragmatist.  Like Hoare, he 
believed that the use of economic sanctions was likely to be too little too late to 
constrain the Duce and could have a detrimental effect on the economies of member 
states that agreed to be part to such a step.  Importantly too, this point of view met 
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with the agreement of the Committee’s chairman, Vasconcellos, but became 
overshadowed by the political fallout in London and in Paris of the pact.  Noel-Baker 
took a different view of Hoare’s actions.  He believed that the Foreign Secretary had 
agreed to the terms of the pact because he was too impatient to see if sanctions would 
work.46   
Anglo-French actions had taken on a perverse, almost tragic character.  The 
willingness to ‘give in to Mussolini’ was ‘because the reactionary British and French 
Governments are more afraid of the results in Europe and Africa of defeating 
Mussolini and vindicating the Covenant than they are of the consequences of helping 
him to defeat the League’.47  A special meeting of the League Council should be 
convened to save the British and French from their own cowardice and to recommend 
an increase rather than a decrease of pressure on the Italian dictator.  The legal 
principals of the situation should be reaffirmed.  The Italian invasion of Abyssinia 
was contrary to Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.  
These were facts that had not changed, so it was difficult to understand why the 
British and French were apparently willing to ignore these facts.  In particular, the 
League should press ahead with approving the adoption of oil sanctions.48  Hoare’s 
willingness to broker a deal with Laval over the future of Abyssinia provided further 
evidence that ‘No amount of painful experience seems to correct their incorrigible 
belief that it is ‘realistic’ to disregard our treaty obligations’.49  As a result, Hoare had 
‘thrust’ Britain ‘back into the mud of dishonour and humiliation’.50  As things stood, 
not only was the League defunct and humiliated, but international diplomacy had 
taken a ‘long step back toward the pre-war Concert of the Great Powers, and to the 
politics of the balance of power, alliances, and an arms race.’51  If the British and 
French allowed the League Covenant to wither on the vine, the people of both 
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countries would be resigning themselves ‘17 years after the world war to end war, to 
becoming cannon fodder once more, to being mere sheep led to the shambles by blind 
shepherds’.52 
 The consequences to Hoare, to the British government and to Anglo-French 
relations of the Hoare-Laval Pact are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this 
volume.  Hoare’s replacement at the Foreign Office, Antony Eden, was much clearer 
and more passionate about his support for the League.53  This point was not lost on 
Noel-Baker.  Under Eden, British League policy was now ‘pulling its socks up’, 
although this was likely to have a mixed effect on British public opinion.54  On the 
one hand, the British people were being encouraged to support the work of the 
League, while at the same time asked to sanction a massive programme of 
rearmament.  The political and diplomatic fallout from such a paradox could be 
avoided if the British government concluded an arbitration and mutual assistance 
treaty with all the European Members of the League whereby the aggressor would be 
designated by the Council (without votes of the Parties).55  In the context of the 
present crisis, this would come into force only against Italy, who would also fall foul 
of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant.  In that context, Britain and France should use 
their League deliberations to consider the adoption of military sanctions and 
collective defence rather than the wasted opportunity of oil sanctions.56  But he was 
not optimistic that such a strategy would become a reality. 
 And on this point, Noel-Baker was correct.  Under Eden’s stewardship, and 
working in conjunction with Laval’s successor at the Quai d’Orsay, Pierre Étienne 
Flandin, Anglo-French League policy towards the crisis became less linear.  It became 
less dependent on statements of outrage and utterances about the imposition of 
sanctions, and became more multi-dimensional.  Eden’s approach was to add teeth to 
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the existing League strategy and to press strongly for the imposition of oil sanctions.  
For that he received Cabinet support on 26 February 1936.57  Flandin, in contrast, 
adopted a much less hawkish approach, requesting that Eden hold fire until the next 
meeting of the Committee of Eighteen on 2 March, thus giving time for a further plea 
to be made to Mussolini to order a ceasefire.58  If no undertaking was received by the 
time the Committee of Eighteen met, then the French government would agree to the 
adoption of oil sanctions.59   
Noel-Baker was sceptical that Mussolini would take advantage of Flandin’s 
offer and believed that the British government should take a lead in imposing oil 
sanctions not least in recognition of the already strong British military presence in the 
eastern Mediterranean.60  A weak political response in London or Geneva would 
undermine the credibility of any threat or deployment of British military action that 
may be necessary.  But it also fell to Britain to convince the French and other key 
European powers that the League as a means of arbitrating international disputes was 
worth defending.  As he told Viscount Cecil of Chelwood: ‘It therefore plainly rests in 
the hands of the British Govt. to decide what the future will be: whether we shall go 
towards peace through the League, or towards destruction through the old 
diplomacy.’61  Ultimately, the reforms of the League may be necessary to enable a 
tougher and more sustained response to be made to the foreign policy aspirations of 
the fascist dictators, but the present time was not the time to propose them.  In a letter 
to Viscount Cecil’s brother, Hugh, at the end of 1935, Noel-Baker had outlined how 
he believed the League should face the crisis in Abyssinia.  The first mistake, he 
argued, was to negotiate with an aggressor, and he cited as a precedent Austen 
Chamberlain’s unwillingness in 1925 to listen to Greek claims to Bulgarian territory 
until Greek forces had retreated from Bulgarian soil.62  That strategy had worked; 
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there was little reason to believe that a similar approach would not work with 
Mussolini.63 What is more, it was important for the British government to take 
decisive action through the League against the Italian dictator because if no such 
action was taken, it could lead to a resurgence of anti Anglo-French African 
nationalism that could affect the general strategic interests of those countries in the 
region.64 
 However, British and French plans became overtaken by events as the 
Abyssinian Emperor, Haile Selassie, agreed to open peace negotiations with the 
Italians on 5 March.   But of almost greater significance was Hitler’s decision to begin 
the remilitarisation of the Rhineland two days later, thus deflecting Anglo-French 
attention away from Mussolini’s activities in Abyssinia.  With two of the Locarno 
powers now in breach of the 1925 pact at the same time, both Flandin and Eden 
became increasingly preoccupied with devising a united Anglo-French stand over the 
unfolding crisis in the Rhineland.65  Evidence of this was Eden’s wavering support for 
the use of sanctions in the early summer of 1936.  Just four months after he had 
received hard-won agreement from the Cabinet to offer British for the imposition of 
sanctions, Eden was urging the same body to agree to their abandonment.   On 4 July, 
forty-four delegates from the sanctionist states approved the termination of the 
programme.  Forty-eight hours later, the Co-ordination Committee met and decided 
that sanctions should be ended on 15 July.  This was, for Noel-Baker, an act of British 
betrayal of the League.66  The British press viewed the League’s decision somewhat 
differently.  The Morning Post and The Daily Mail believed that any attempt by the 
League to influence the outcome of the Abyssinian crisis was contrary to the ‘facts of 
international life’ where ‘the survival of the fittest in the jungle’ was inevitable and 
that ‘any idea of supranational law’ was ‘unrealistic and wrong headed’.67  A leader 
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on 4 July decried the decision to impose sanctions as an attempt by the League to 
provoke war, rather than to limit it.  It was well known that the deployment of 
economic sanctions either caused wars to break out or made them spread.68   
Northedge has claimed that this shift came about because Flandin and Eden 
believed that in the final analysis, despite all their vehement statements condemning 
Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia, that Italy was not as important a power to British 
and French interests as Germany.  That was not entirely true.  In January 1935, Laval 
had been sufficiently worried by Mussolini’s increasing bellicosity to persuade the 
Italian dictator to withdraw his troops from their bases close to Italy’s frontier with 
France.  But be that as it may, a mutual distrust of Germany had provided the 
lifeblood of the Entente Cordiale since its creation in 1904.  Indeed, during his speech 
to the League Assembly on 11 September 1935, Hoare had noted that Laval ‘had the 
whole time been thinking of the German danger’.  The much closer geographical 
proximity of the Rhineland crisis to Britain and France did give it a strategic 
immediacy that the events in Abyssinia had by this time ceased to have.  Despite the 
presence of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean, by the spring of 1936 it was 
clear that for the foreseeable future at least, Mussolini’s aspirations in north Africa 
would not directly challenge the Suez Canal or the territorial integrity of British and 
French mandates and colonial possessions in the region. 
When the Abyssinian surrender in July 1936 came, for Noel-Baker, final 
evidence that the policy of collective security so fundamental to the League and the 
right wing nationalist ideologies of the Italian, Japanese and German dictatorships 
were intrinsically and irreconcilably opposing forces in international diplomacy.  As 
he told Clement Attlee, ‘These regimes are incurably, inherently and permanently 
hostile to everything for which the collective system stands.’69  This schism had come 
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about, he was clear, because of Anglo-French indecisiveness.  This vacillation had 
been caused by a weak National Government foreign policy instigated primarily by 
the Conservative members of the coalition.  He urged Attlee to secure an undertaking 
from the Labour Party’s National Executive that it would not recognise any peace 
agreement resulting from the end of the conflict in Abyssinia that condoned Italian 
aggression towards that country.70  An alternative foreign policy strategy should be 
waiting ready to be implemented as soon as the British people became tired of Eden 
and Baldwin and replaced them with a Foreign Secretary and Premier drawn from the 
ranks of the Labour Party.  Furthermore, that the League should be at the heart of its 
implementation, along with an attempt to breath fresh life in to the Entente Cordiale.  
The only caveat was that Ramsay MacDonald was not to be permitted a leading role 
on the grounds that his mental faculties were now unsound and because his policies 
on disarmament during the first half of the decade had hindered rather than promoted 
Anglo-French cooperation over the League.71  While military operations may have 
reached a denouement in Abyssinia, Noel-Baker’s Labour-led British foreign policy 
would be rooted in continuing to oppose the Italian occupation through the use of 
sanctions.  While he recognised that their applications had proved to be one of the 
main stumbling blocks for the maintenance of collective security, he believed that the 
League had few other options.  Thus he would also be able to demonstrate to the 
League’s present Conservative detractors, especially Winston Churchill and Neville 
Chamberlain, that it was not now defunct.72 
Working on his long-held premise that it was British rather than French 
foreign policy that gave direction to the Entente Cordiale, Noel-Baker believed that 
the most effective way of garnering French support for such a plan of action was not 
through direct British pressure on France.73  Instead, as he suggested to Pierre Cot, the 
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support of the France’s League allies among the Little Entente powers should be 
secured, which in turn could be used as leverage to persuade the Quai d’Orsay not to 
abandon the League as a diplomatic tool.  In other words, the French would not be 
compelled to follow the British lead in coping with the aftermath of the Abyssinian 
peace settlement alone.74  Noel-Baker was also aware that during 1935, the Quai 
d’Orsay had already looked eastwards in search of diplomatic allies.  The resulting 
Franco-Soviet pact provided a potentially useful ideological weapon should there be 
further confrontation with the fascist dictators.  But he also regarded Soviet 
willingness to form an alliance with one of the most important countries in the League 
as evidence that Stalin had not lost faith in that organisation.75  Furthermore, Noel-
Baker had reason to believe that that beleaguered democratic government in Spain 
would be in favour of continuing to impose sanctions against Italy, thereby reducing 
the chance of the growing nationalist movement in Spain securing support from the 
Duce.76  If the campaign for the maintenance of sanctions received sufficient 
international support, the British government might be willing to give practical 
support in the forms of ammunition and money to the Abyssinians, eventually giving 
them the wherewithal to drive out the Italian invaders.  Noel-Baker reflected: 
‘If…Sanctions were kept on, and the League were finally to triumph in Abyssinia, the 
effect would be profound.’77 
 While the overwhelming consensus of opinion among international historians 
is that the League was a failure and that the Abyssinian crisis represented one of the 
final chapters in its history of slow, often indecisive and inadequate responses to the 
diplomatic crises of the interwar period, Noel-Baker’s response to the events in north 
Africa between 1935-36 illustrates that that description is too two-dimensional.  As 
already indicated, Noel-Baker was not the only supporter of the League who believed 
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that the way forward was for the League to reinvent itself rather than simply to 
surrender its remit altogether.  It could be argued that it took the Second World War – 
both its outbreak and the thorny issue of making peace after it – to bring about this 
realisation.  But that was simply not the case.  So why then was the message of 
League grandees such as Noel-Baker, Viscount Cecil of Chelwood and Gilbert 
Murray not heeded earlier, and if it had been, would the events set in motion by 
Hitler’s decision to invade Poland in September 1939 have been prevented or 
postponed?  At the time of the crisis in Abyssinia, all three men had few real 
opportunities to influence government policy.  Cecil, as President of the League of 
Nations Union, was the most prominent, but despite his enthusiastic promotion of the 
Peace Ballot, by 1935 he was in his seventies and anxious to make way for a younger 
man.  Murray had returned to academia and was also a septuagenarian at the start of 
the Abyssinian crisis, while Noel-Baker’s Labour Party formed only a minority part 
of the National Government.  But these facts do not reveal the whole picture.   By 
1936, the British and French governments had not so much lost interest or faith in the 
League but had come to realise that it alone was unlikely to contain the territorial 
ambitions of the fascist dictators.  Consequently, after that date, greater emphasis was 
placed on developing other means of deterring or preventing war – not to replace the 
League – but to operate in conjunction with it.  The policy of appeasement pursued by 
the Chamberlain government between 1937 and 1939 was largely consistent with the 
League’s philosophy of collective security.  The British and French policies of 
rearmament were at face value at odds with the League Covenant, but the reality was 
not the case.  Anglo-French rearmament policies in the late 1930s were intended 
primarily to deter war, but if that tactic failed, would provide some means of 
preparedness if a conflict broke out.  This strategy also indicated that the British and 
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French governments recognised the validity of the argument put forward by Noel-
Baker and other supporters of the League about providing a stronger means of 
enforcing its decisions.  Of course the League failed to prevent the outbreak of war in 
1939, but this point needs to be viewed in the wider diplomatic context of a much 
more multi-stranded approach to containing Hitler and Mussolini.  Ultimately, the 
best traditions of the League, backed up with its own means of enforcing its decisions 
with military force emerged after the Second World War as the United Nations.  That 
organisation too has, of course, had a chequered history, but its reputation has been 
treated more kindly by scholars and commentators on international affairs than 
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement.  This is in no small part due to the vision – not 
idealistic but pragmatic – of Noel-Baker, Cecil and Murray during and after the 
Abyssinian Crisis. 
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